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Kafka and Buber
Testimony and Impossibility 
András Czeglédi
“I also talked to Buber yesterday; as a person he is lively and simple and remarkable, and seems to have 
nothing to do with the lukewarm things he has written” – wrote Franz Kafka to his fiancée Felice Bauer 
in the early 1913. What is the meaning of this harsh, yet respectful portraiture of Buber? Was it a casual 
ironic remark – or was it rather the way Kafka really thought of Martin Buber? And to what extent was 
Kafka important for Buber? How can we understand the collaboration between the writer and 
philosopher? Close reading, contextualization and Begegnungsereignis (encounter as fundamental 
event). | Keywords: Kafka, Buber, Uchronic Thinking, Remembering the Future, Encounter, Testimony
Confession and lies are one and the same. In order to confess, one tells 
lies. One cannot express what one is, for that is precisely what one is; 
one can communicate only what one is not, that is, lies. Only in the 
chorus there may be a certain truth.
(Kafka, 1954, p. 308; the translation is slightly revised)
1.
Is it possible, when it comes to confessing and witnessing in an abstract sense, 
to avoid adopting a personal perspective? It sure is – but it would be in vain. 
Due to inquiries into uchronia, uchronic thinking, and uchronic intellectual 
history, I have not been able to find interest in almost anything else recently, 
but in the crossroads, or clashes of testimony, possibility and impossibility. The 
missed, or never expected opportunities, the cross-referential relationship 
between opportunity and the actual state of affairs, and the all-encompassing, 
reflective account of these, the testimony, and its possible nature.
First, let me provide an account of two instances of my personal involvement 
with testimony and impossibility. I’ll begin with the earliest one: a few years 
ago, having finished my dissertation, I realized in awe that it should have been 
written a hundred years earlier, by the young – and therefore, still ‘goodʼ – 
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Lukács, and, naturally, in German. However, this would have been impossible 
for many reasons. The central aim of the dissertation was to examine the 
extent to which Dostoevsky, especially his novel Demons, had influenced 
Nietzsche in his later years, most of all his specific concept of nihilism – and, as 
it later turned out, it did, to a great extent. The complex, comparative study of 
this relationship was very much in the air towards the end of the Belle Époque, 
and we can mention here the works of Brandes (1889) or those of Shestov 
(1969), but it became clear to me while reading Lukács’s Theory of the Novel and 
especially his Notes on Dostoevsky that this interrelationship could have been 
the great theme of Lukács in his planned book on Dostoevsky. He should have 
‘onlyʼ elaborated on his idea that Nietzsche, so to speak, is a mere Hebbelian-
Hegelian sidetrack in a larger European context, but that the supremacy of the 
anthropological atheism of Kirillov-Nietzsche in opposition to the merely 
cosmological European atheism is obvious. (Lukács, 2009, p. 271 ff.)1 However, 
producing a ‘seriousʼ full-fledged text on this subject would have been 
impossible at the time for a multiplicity of reasons, especially for philological 
ones: the contemporary philological inquiries into Nietzsche and Dostoevsky 
were quite far from being ideal. However, after a century – and, to deploy a 
postmodern cliché, with the end of great theories and narratives – such an 
endeavour might turn into a philological summary and/or mere infotainment.
The other personal aspect that is important to mention is very closely related 
to the present paper itself, since the original version of this text, which I have 
modified to some extent, was supposed to be presented at the Péter Losonczi 
Memorial Conference in the summer of 2016. (Losonczi, who has passed away 
prematurely, was a representative of the contemporary middle generation of 
Hungarian philosophers.) Eventually, the paper’s fate took an unusual turn, 
since I was not able to attend the conference, resulting in one less personal 
testimony, but the original paper was still presented by helpful 
intermediaries.2 
It is certainly true that we may often have a sense of ‘belated testimonyʼ in our 
strained efforts to make sense of the world, that is, those of us who are 
concerned with the humanities. It often seems that we are at the wrong place 
at the wrong time – and that we are lacking the essential skill that is ever so 
important in love and politics: good timing. I am not certain that Minerva’s owl 
departs only at dusk, but she sure comes late. Albeit, I do not say this in an 
apprehensive, or fatalist tone, since I do believe, to paraphrase William James, 
that if man did not spend his whole life on a quest for the superfluous, he 
would never have established himself as inexpugnably as he has done in the 
necessary (James, 1897, p. 131).
Approaching our present subjects, Kafka and Buber, I wish to examine 
thoroughly the passage I quoted at the beginning of my paper that 
simultaneously illuminates the subject of testimony and impossibility, or, more 
precisely, the impossibility of true testimony. I found this passage a relatively 
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long time ago – and Péter Losonczi has played more than a small part in this 
discovery. Let me recount this story, before we proceed to somehow make sense 
of the sentence itself. 
Péter, who was well-known for his capabilities as an organizer and as someone 
who prepares and mediates important encounters between people, organized a 
big conference on Buber, back in the mid-1990s. The reason for the symposium, 
taking place at the Merlin Theater of Budapest, was the recent release of 
Buber’s Tales of the Hasidim in Hungarian, published by Atlantisz Press. After 
all these years, I have sharp recollections of three presenters – György Tatár, 
our highly influential professor, and two mutual friends of ours: Zoltán Hidas 
and Ágoston Schmelowszky. It was clear from the beginning that Tatár would 
talk about Gershom Scholem’s criticism of Buber, while Hidas would draw 
parallels between the philosophical insights of Kierkegaard and Buber. 
Schmelowszky may have talked about the Hasidic tales themselves, edited by 
Buber, but I can no longer remember his exact topic.
What I do remember vividly, however, is my embarrassment: Péter has, once 
again, come up with a great idea, and – to be honest, a very atypical behaviour 
among scholars of humanities coming up with great ideas – he was able to 
substantiate it. We were attending this imposing conference, and many of my 
peers had already found a way to contribute to it. I, on the other hand, was 
quite unsure about how to satisfyingly fit in, given my philosophical interests 
at the time, which included, among other things, research on Nietzsche. A thin 
link to Zarathustra would have been obvious: Eastern Europe being a place of 
mystical interconnectedness, it was Buber who almost first translated the first 
part of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra into Polish – but somehow, I was not keen on 
the idea.
Therefore, I was trying to do something completely different, only it was not 
clear to me what this different topic should be. Then, I somehow opened a 
collection of Kafka’s diaries and letters. All of a sudden, the following passage 
caught my eye:
I also talked to Buber yesterday; as a person he is lively and simple and 
remarkable, and seems to have nothing to do with the lukewarm things 
he has written. (Kafka, 1973, p. 161)3 
Finally, I ended up with addressing a different topic in my conference paper 
(Buber as an ‘anarchistʼ, the archaic actuality of his Paths in Utopia, and its 
relation to Buber’s philosophy of dialogue), but Kafka’s statement has been 
hunting me ever since. 
Let us have a look at the so-called facts, of which we know since Nietzsche that 
they do not exist on their own, since they are themselves mere interpretations. 
The excerpt is from a letter, written by Kafka to his betrothed, Felice Bauer on 
January 19, 1913. The letter itself is only a minute part of a larger stream of 
letters written by Kafka to Felice, for which he had even given up keeping his 
diaries for almost half a year – diaries which were hitherto of utmost 
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importance to him. One can even deem this to be a hiatus in this trace of the 
perhaps most exciting period of Kafka’s whole life. Exciting, because of his 
incredible productivity as an author at the time: his first book titled 
Contemplation was published, The Metamorphosis, The Judgement and Amerika/
Lost in America were written during this period, while he also wrote extensive 
letters.
No delight is without consequences, however. 
The growing stream of letters to Felice (more than 300 in the first 11 
months of their relationship) began to consume his literary 
capabilities, and Kafka felt that he had to choose between ‘life’ (as in a 
life shared with Felice) and ‘writing’. Their first engagement in June 
1914 was broken up four weeks later – Kafka had made his choice. 
(Wagenbach, 1996, p. 26 f.)4  
An important thing to note here: the fact that Felice was the recipient of the 
letter mentioning Buber is barely negligible. It mirrors the nature of their 
relationship, in which Kafka took up the role of a superior educator, a role 
which he often played with considerable smugness. We should also consider 
the phenomenon which Harold Bloom calls the 'anxiety of influence': it’s as if 
Kafka struggled to recover how Buber’s texts, and especially his Tales of Rabbi 
Nachman, had fundamentally influenced his own writings, a fact that is 
philologically verifiable.
Anyhow, diaries were replaced by more serious writings and letters. In parallel, 
of course, letter writing, which never was a mere private activity for Kafka, 
gradually became a platform for high-level intellectual reflections. Events of 
Kafka’s life are more easily retraceable from his letters than from the diaries, 
since the latter “are more like notebooks of a literary author.” (Györffy, 1981, 
767) Although Kafka dates the entries in his notebooks, booklets and other 
papers, a significant part of these later became part of the œuvre in their own 
right, since they mostly comprise short story fragments, different versions of 
texts later finalized, etc. - the actual diary is only an insignificant part of these 
writings. 
The passage from Kafka quoted above has a marvellously enigmatic nature. It 
objectively documents a single event, the fact of his meeting and conversation 
with Buber on January 18. The what, the where, the excess of this dialogue 
remains unknown. On the other hand, there is the laconic, almost 
indecipherable interpretation of what has happened. 
What is the real meaning of this simultaneously appreciative and even warm 
(since he depicts Buber as personally “lively and simple and remarkable”), yet 
quite ruthless (the distinction between Buber, the individual, and Buber, the 
author of “lukewarm things”) note? What is the reason for such a judgement 
and attestation [allegation?] concerning Buber? Is it a momentary, ironic side 
note, or is it a general, decisive account of the way he thinks of Buber? And 
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what about the other side of this narrative? What did it mean to Buber to meet 
Kafka? 
It might be easiest to start with the latter question: Buber had always talked 
about Kafka with utmost reverence, considering him - unsurprisingly - as one 
of the most prominent intellectual figures, and it might be safe to say, as a 
witnessin' intellectual figure of his age. It should be noted that it seems as if 
Kafka’s 'prospective' relevance, the fact that many had felt and have been 
recognizing ever since, that he writes about something that is yet to come,5  is 
less conspicuous in Buber’s case. This prospective aspect of Kafka’s works is 
relevant in the sense that in the 1960s, in the age of “realism without shores”, 
Kafka, decades after his death, becomes one of the most authentic portraitists 
of social reality, the most important realist author of the era… This was the 
case, not only among theoreticians, but also among practicing artists. For 
instance, many claimed that to capture the horrors of the Holocaust, to bear 
testimony to this event, which is on the verge of the impossible, one must 
reach back to Kafka. (Joseph Losey’s sadly forgotten 1976 film, Monsieur Klein 
might be a quite relevant example here, since one cannot easily decide whether 
he’s watching a film on the Holocaust, or a Kafka-adaptation.)
To answer the first, aforementioned question regarding Kafka’s attitude 
towards Buber – i.e. are Kafka’s remarks momentary, or decisive, why does 
Kafka write what he writes? –, we must first clarify the extent to which Kafka 
was aware of Buber’s intellectual background. 
A practical division of Buber’s intellectual life consists of three major phases 
(Komoróczy, 1992, 357). (1) Work on the folkloristic religion of Eastern 
European Jewry. (2) The translation of, and commentary on the Bible, a work 
which he had begun together with Rosenzweig, and finished on his own after 
Rosenzweig’s death. (3) His work on the ethics and philosophy of dialogue. It is 
certain that the third phase is the best-known, since many associate Buber only 
with his book I and Thou. This magnum opus of Buber’s was published merely 
months before Kafka’s death, ten years after his letter to Felice. Of course, one 
may argue that the principles laid out in I and Thou are also present more 
generally throughout Buber’s philosophy, but it becomes quite clear when 
reading Kafka’s diaries, letters, and other notes that he was unconcerned with 
this aspect of Buber’s work. Moreover, he couldn’t have been aware of the 
Bible-translation, since it was published only after Kafka’s death. Therefore, 
Kafka knew Buber most of all as a researcher of the Eastern, Yiddish-speaking 
Jewry, as the author of the Tales of the Hasidim.
What’s more, this was the topic that affected Kafka most deeply. Similar to his 
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friend, Max Brod, he came from a highly assimilated background; the family 
was made up mostly of so-called 'four-day Jews' (which means that they went 
to the synagogue only four times a year: on the major Jewish holidays and on 
Emperor Franz Joseph’s birthday), who were not familiar with Hebrew liturgical 
texts, and wished to conform in every way to their non-Jewish surroundings. 
This must have been especially difficult in Prague, where the Kafka family 
resided, since their complex identity matrix was further complicated by 
tensions between Czech and German identities. In his formative as well as in 
his mature years, Franz Kafka showed a considerable interest in his Jewish 
roots. The ultimate direction and meaning of this interest      are, of course, 
highly contested in the academic literature concerned with Kafka. 
However, the passionate interest itself is quite obvious. The range of subjects 
Kafka was interested in extends way beyond the basic issues of identity and 
assimilation: he was preoccupied with many things, from Galician Yiddish 
theatre – he has considered his friendship with the actor Yitzchak Lowy as one 
of the most important relationships of his life – through the Yiddish language 
itself to Hebrew, which he started to study at the age of 30.  In this period he 
was also thinking a lot about traveling to Palestine – he could never have 
carried out a true Aliyah, however, since the British Mandate of Palestine was 
welcoming at the time only immigrants in good health condition, and – as it is 
well-known – Kafka was suffering from severe tuberculosis, a condition that 
eventually proved to be fatal.
2.
This latter event is emphasized in an uchronic essay by Iris Bruce, titled What if 
Franz Kafka had immigrated to Palestine? (Bruce, 2016) Bruce is a specialist of 
Kafka, who deploys an academic style of prose in this particular essay, writing 
in accordance with all scientific conventions, in a manner that is eerily similar 
to that of Borges. The detailed essay that relies heavily on actual primary and 
secondary sources, recognized authors and texts, is a quasi-academic 
biography excerpt. Its fictional author is Hugo Immerwahr: the last name is not 
without meaning, referring to the presumed ever-present honesty of the 
narrator (and possibly to the first-ever woman to receive an academic degree 
from a German university); the first name is also significant, which is very 
likely to be a reference to Hugo Bergmann, a prominent figure of modern 
cultural Zionism. Bergmann was a close friend of Kafka’s from their high 
school years; his works, and subsequent Aliyah had a great impact on Kafka – 
as mentioned in Kafka’s biographies, including in this fictional-uchronic one.
Moreover, Bergmann is a unique link between Buber and Kafka. He is a devoted 
student and follower of Buber, and while Kafka has reservations about the 
master, he is enthusiastic about the works of Bergmann, especially his Jawne 
und Jerusalem – a text which exhibits considerable influence by Buber.
Buber, in some sense, is a key intellectual figure in Bruce’s fiction. Although the 
imagined transformative event, the point of divergence, is the result of his 
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moving from Berlin to Palestine with his last love, Dora Diamant, it is Buber 
who convinces Kafka, who lives to be old, to write again – and in Hebrew. Thus, 
Kafka becomes the author of The Trial in Ivrit, receiving the Nobel Prize for 
literature in 1966. Nevertheless, he remains his actual self:
Kafka’s alternative vision addresses the complexities and absurdities of 
contemporary realities beyond our own time and place. […] His voice is 
both new and old. It is heard by many generations around the world 
and Israel, too: a modern, secular Jewish voice, questioning certainties, 
deconstructing truths, continually searching for alternate answers in 
climates of conflicts. (Bruce, 2016, 214)
3.
It is sure, after all, that it was this deep interest in his own Jewishness that led 
Kafka to get to know Buber, mostly recognized at the time as an authority on 
Hasidic legends and Jewish folklore. At this point, we must note that Buber’s 
œuvre has a fourth tenet, which, although      closely related to the three 
phases I mentioned earlier, should be distinguished for heuristic reasons. This 
may be called (4) public life. As it is well-known, Buber was far from being a 
Dryasdust, he was not conducting research for its own sake, and was quite 
active in the public sphere. He was a proud and devoted Zionist, who saw 
Zionism, above all, as part of his cultural and intellectual work, and 
consistently opposed the simplified interpretations of it, never considering it 
to be a friend-and-foe equation – as many do politics since Carl Schmitt, for 
instance –, or an expression of statist, or anti-Arab sentiments, or what he saw 
as the self-deception of many Western and Central European Jews.6 
It was the public figure and the Jewish folklorist, then, who was familiar with 
Kafka. In other words, he had to encounter the dialectic – what a pity, that this 
multilayered philosophical term has been so permanently discredited – that 
Buber’s public and intellectual work was amalgamated, or to put it more 
bluntly, was one and the same. This provided a framework for criticism of 
Buber, which we can discover in Scholem’s and even Rosenzweig’s attitude 
towards him: despite all their respect and appreciation for Buber and their 
gratitude for all they had learned from him, they were disconcerted by the 
extent to which Buber shapes his historical research according to his 
worldview, especially when it comes to selecting, editing, and amending 
Hasidic texts. Naturally, the source of Kafka’s dislike was not so prima facie 
philological, or academic, but it is, in fact, related to the basis of these 
criticisms, that of Buber’s general outlook on the world.
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One can observe, reading this letter, an atmosphere of lecturing in his words. At this point of 
the letter, when Kafka would start discussing Buber’s Chinese stories, comes a minute 
excursion: Kafka runs out of blotting paper, and mentions that while waiting for the ink to dry 
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But, what else do we know about these antagonistic feelings besides the 
excerpt from Kafka’s letter to Felice?
Kafka heard Buber lecturing in 1910, at an event in the Jewish Council House of 
Prague, organized by the Bar Kochba Association. We know this from implicit 
sources (from Max Brod, and others), and from the fact that Kafka mentions 
having heard Buber speak before, in his 1913 letter. Buber appears for the first 
time not in Kafka’s January 19th letter, but in another letter written to Felice 
three days earlier. From this earlier letter, we can learn what was on his agenda 
for that night: he writes about Buber’s lecture on Jewish myths, which he 
claims would not be exciting enough on its own to get him out of his room, 
since he had heard Buber speak before, and Buber did not make a lasting 
impression. Kafka writes about always missing something from what Buber has 
to say – but, with a twist that is foreshadowing his later opinion on Buber, he 
clarifies that Buber has, after all, the ability for great things, and that he had 
found his Chinesische Geister- und Liebesgeschichten quite splendid. Kafka finds 
a reason to go out, after all, for after Buber’s lecture, a public reading by 
Gertrude Eysoldt had taken place, which he was keen to attend. 7 
It was three days later that Kafka wrote his letter with its strange verdict on 
Buber to Felice. He reveals nothing about the lecture itself, only about their 
first meeting and actual discussion two days later. Moreover, the letter also 
reveals the not insignificant detail, that his first meeting in person, although 
did not change it completely, but to some extent modified Kafka’s formerly 
unfavourable opinion on Buber. 
This may appear as an unusual and quite rare turn of events. In most cases, this 
happens the other way round: someone who amazes us intellectually in his 
writings might turn out to be a disappointment in person. The reverse of this 
happened in the present case: personal contact made Buber more favourable in 
Kafka’s eyes. (Side note: this instance always makes me remember the wise 
advice of Alpár Losoncz, a Hungarian philosopher from Vojvodina: in order to 
save ourselves from disappointment, try to avoid meeting contemporary 
authors and thinkers close to our heart! Although Alpár is a contemporary 
thinker who is close to my heart, I do try to keep his company any time I get a 
chance).
So, was Kafka’s ambivalent impression of Buber a lasting one?
Fundamentally, yes.
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In the remaining years, another significant intellectual encounter took place 
between them: two of Kafka’s important texts, Jackals and Arabs and A Report 
to an Academy, were published in Der Jude, a journal founded by Buber. As a 
good friend, Max Brod recommended Kafka to Buber as a possible editor, but 
Kafka respectfully declined for his work-overload. A bit later, however, he sent 
these two texts to Buber, who was eager to receive them.8 Albeit this did not 
change the fact that in the subsequent, sporadic occasions Buber appeared in 
Kafka’s letters and notes, he was always treated with the same, strange 
attitude. 
The question remains: why was that?
We can hardly know for certain – the few subsequent fragments do not add 
much to what we already know. Academic literature on the subject usually 
proclaims that although Kafka was an avid follower of Jewish public life, Buber 
was, nevertheless, always found wanting in his eyes.9  
This is possible. 
But, to conclude with questions, isn’t it possible that Kafka had problems with 
the sometimes overly didactic teachings of Buber, his direct testimony? Isn’t 
this assumption supported by the fact that in the case of the aforementioned 
two texts Buber suggested using the parabolic subtitle of “Fable,” while Kafka 
insisted on branding them “animal stories”? And to view all this from a reverse 
perspective: can a philosophy such as Buber’s ever avoid being didactic? Isn’t it 
only natural that Kafka, who burst out and wrote: “What have I in common 
with Jews? I have hardly anything in common with myself and should stand 
very quietly in a corner, content that I can breathe,”10 and who wrote Before the 
Law, this ultimate account of the final encounter and the impossibility of 
testimony, does have an ambivalent attitude towards Buber, the man who 
proclaimed: at first, there was the encounter and “All real life is 
encounter.” (Buber, 1970, 62)?11 
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